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Editors’Summary
THE BROOKINGS PANEL ON Economic Activity held its eighty-third confer-
ence in Washington, D.C., on March 29 and 30, 2007. This issue of the
Brookings Papers includes the papers and discussions presented at the
conference. The five papers in this issue span a range of domestic and
global issues of current importance. The first paper uses risk analysis to
assess the large foreign reserves holdings of emerging market countries.
The second paper models the role of information technology in the rapid
productivity growth of the past decade. The third paper examines the rela-
tion between foreign capital inﬂows and growth among nonindustrialized
economies. The fourth paper estimates the effects of dividends on con-
sumption and the implied effects of the 2003 dividend tax cuts. The final
paper looks for explanations for the failure of long-term rates to respond
as expected to the Federal Reserve’s monetary tightening of recent years.
IN 2005 THE INTERNATIONAL reserves of emerging market countries
reached nearly $2 trillion, four times their level of the early 1990s relative
to GDP. Some commentators have argued that such massive reserves are
prudent insurance against the increased volatility of capital flows accom-
panying ﬁnancial globalization, but others claim they are excessive and that
these countries could put the funds to better use toward their economic
development. In the first article of this issue, Olivier Jeanne examines
whether the risk of currency crisis or a sudden cutoff in lending justiﬁes the
level of reserves held by these countries. 
Historically, various rules of thumb have been used to make this assess-
ment. Jeanne is much more ambitious. He calibrates a formal model of opti-
mal reserves holdings to country-specific empirical estimates of the
parameters crucial to determining this optimum. He ﬁnds that the reserves
held by most Latin American countries can be rationalized with this model,
but the risks of a capital account crisis confronting the Asian emerging
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ings. This conclusion has implications both for the need for further accu-
mulation and for the management of existing reserves. In the ﬁnal sections
of the paper, Jeanne considers the opportunities for emerging market coun-
tries to diversify their investment, the implications of such a change in
investment behavior for global ﬁnancial markets, and possible international
arrangements for using this wealth to more efﬁciently insure against future
crises and to promote ﬁnancial development. 
Jeanne begins by documenting the recent buildup in international reserves
by thirty-two emerging market countries. In the decade before 1990 these
countries held reserves averaging 5 percent of their GDP, a ratio comparable
to that in industrial economies. Since then, however, this average has grown
by a factor of four, to roughly 22 percent of GDPby 2005. More than half of
the dollar growth in these countries’reserves during the period took place in
Asia following the 1997–98 crisis in that region. China’s ratio of reserves to
GDP is similar to that of other emerging Asian countries, but because of its
size China now holds the largest stock of international reserves in the world. 
Growth in a country’s international reserves is necessarily financed by
some combination of current account surpluses and capital inﬂows. Among
the Asian emerging market countries, current account surpluses accounted
for 63 percent of their reserves accumulation during 2000–05. In contrast,
the Latin American economies ran sizable current account deﬁcits, and cap-
ital inflows amounted to 137 percent of their reserves accumulation. The
experience of the Asian economies dominates the overall picture: for all
emerging market countries combined, current account surpluses account for
almost 60 percent of reserves accumulation during this period. Jeanne notes
that the ﬂow of capital from developing to developed economies was equiv-
alent to more than 40 percent of the current account deficit of the United
States in the same period. He also documents various salient features of
the gross capital flows underlying the net flows to and from countries in his
sample. Reserves accumulation constitutes more than 60 percent of the
gross foreign asset accumulation of these countries. In contrast, foreign
direct investment (FDI) accounts for almost 70 percent of the increase in
their gross liabilities. This investment pattern is not new and is evident in
the balance sheets of these economies. The share of reserves in gross for-
eign assets is almost nine times as large in the emerging market countries as
in the industrial countries, whereas the share of FDI in their liabilities is
almost twice as large. 
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reserves can be explained as a prudent response to the increased risks asso-
ciated with their increased trade and ﬁnancial integration with the rest of the
world? Jeanne reports that the recent buildup is not consistent with any of
three conventional reserves adequacy measures: the ratios of reserves to
imports, to short-term external debt, and to the M2 measure of the money
supply. By any of these yardsticks, reserves ratios have increased enor-
mously since 1990. For example, reserves in the entire sample of emerg-
ing market countries in 1990 were roughly in line with the informal rule
that a country’s reserves should equal or exceed three months of its imports,
but reserves today are close to seven months of imports. The Greenspan-
Guidotti rule, which states that reserves should equal or exceed short-term
debt, was developed to better capture the risks stemming from the capital
account after the crises of the 1990s. Reserves in emerging market coun-
tries have now risen to ﬁve times their short-term debt. 
Jeanne notes that reserves also significantly exceed the predictions of
regression-based empirical models that do a good job of predicting reserves
holdings before the Asian crisis, based on a few key variables that should
affect the desired level of precautionary reserves. He observes that such
regressions fail to capture the profound effect that the 1997–98 crisis has
had on countries’perception of risk. That crisis marked a watershed, after
which emerging market countries became painfully aware that even sound
macroeconomic policies did not insulate them from contagion and sharp
reversals in capital ﬂows. Jeanne points out that capital account instability
and large capital account shocks, or “sudden stops,” are relatively new phe-
nomena in Asia, where capital outflows and reserves losses in the crisis
period were unprecedented. 
Neither the informal rules of thumb nor the earlier regression studies that
found reserves to be adequate were based on an explicit model of precau-
tionary reserves. Jeanne employs an empirical version of such a model to
judge the extent to which reserves in his sample of countries are currently
excessive. His analysis builds on a long line of literature on optimal
reserves, inspired by a seminal 1996 contribution by Robert Heller,
although the traditional models used an objective function only loosely
related to domestic welfare. Jeanne speciﬁes a model that is speciﬁcally tied
to welfare but retains some of the simplicity of the earlier literature. 
The model is of a small, open economy vulnerable to crises, where a
crisis is defined by the loss of access to external credit and the associated
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the probability of a crisis and dampens the damaging effect on consumption
when a crisis does take place. To capture the intertemporal nature of
reserves decisions in the simplest way possible, the model has only three
periods. The model economy is populated by a representative consumer
who holds a certain amount of foreign assets, or “sovereign wealth,” in
period 0. This wealth can be invested either in liquid international reserves
or in an illiquid asset that has a higher expected return over two periods
but is not available for use until the last period. In exchange for lower
returns, investing in reserves provides two beneﬁts: it lowers the probabil-
ity of a crisis occurring in period 1, and it insures consumption in that
period against the risk of a crisis, an event that entails a large capital out-
ﬂow and a loss of current output. 
Jeanne captures the first benefit by making the probability of a crisis a
decreasing function of the ratio of reserves to short-term debt. When he
later calibrates the model, he uses a probit speciﬁcation, implying that the
function is the cumulative distribution of the normal function. The second
beneﬁt, that of insuring consumption when a crisis occurs, depends on the
amount by which resources available for first-period consumption are
reduced in the event of a crisis and on the curvature of the utility function.
In a crisis the resources available to support consumption are reduced for
two reasons: output is reduced by some fraction of potential output, and the
country is unable to roll over the external short-term debt that is due, which
reduces imports. This is what the literature calls a “sudden stop” of capital
inﬂows. Subject to this constraint from reduced resources and the inability
to borrow, the representative consumer decides what portion of available
resources to consume in the ﬁrst period and what portion to carry into the
second period. In the absence of a crisis, the consumer simply decides on
current consumption and on the change in debt and reserves, constrained by
potential output. Reserves and debt have the same rate of interest between
periods 0, 1, and 2, which for two periods is less than that on the illiquid
investment. Welfare in period 2 is characterized simply as period-2 wealth,
equal to period-2 income plus the balance of assets minus liabilities car-
ried into the period and the interest accrued on that balance. This assump-
tion implies constant marginal utility of consumption in period 2, making
solution of the model quite simple. 
The qualitative characteristics of optimal reserves holdings are intuitive,
increasing in the size of the crisis shock and with the degree of risk aver-
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that if the consumer has constant relative risk aversion and the probability
of a crisis is independent of the quantity of reserves, optimal reserves are
related to a simple function of the opportunity cost divided by the prob-
ability of crisis, and the size of the resource shock. In the event of a crisis
all of the reserves are consumed. He observes that the optimal level could
be either higher or lower than under the Greenspan-Guidotti rule: higher
because of the value of smoothing a fall in output as well as the capital
outflow, or lower because of the opportunity costs ignored in that rule.
When an increase in reserves reduces the probability of crisis, the optimal
level may even exceed the maximum size of the shock that could occur so
that some reserves may be saved in the event of a crisis. 
Jeanne next turns to calibration of the model, beginning with the role of
reserves in crisis prevention. Analysts have distinguished two types of
crises, currency crises and sudden stops of foreign capital inﬂows. Jeanne
estimates the effect of reserves on the probability of each type of crisis,
which he identifies by four different criteria, covering the broad range of
definitions used by various authors. Currency crises are identified by the
rate of domestic currency depreciation, or the sum of that rate and the rate
of reserves loss, using various thresholds and timings. Sudden stops are
identified by a substantial drop in net capital inflows relative to GDP,
accompanied or not by declines in output and the current account, again
with varying thresholds and timings. Jeanne estimates a univariate probit
regression for each deﬁnition of crisis for each of ﬁve different measures of
reserves adequacy. 
Since Jeanne uses four different combinations of time and country
dummy variables, each measure of reserves adequacy is used in sixteen
probit regressions for each type of crisis. Several facts stand out from the
results. First, the ratio of reserves to short-term debt is the best predictor
of a currency crisis and is both statistically and economically signiﬁcant in
all sixteen probit regressions. In the range of estimated coefﬁcients on this
reserves ratio, doubling the Greenspan-Guidotti ratio of 1 reduces the prob-
ability of a crisis from roughly 10 percent to 6 percent, assuming a pre-
vention benefit parameter of 0.3. However, there are diminishing returns:
increasing the reserves ratio from 5 to 6 lowers the probability by less than
1 percentage point. Two other reserves adequacy measures, the ratio of
reserves to imports and that of reserves to GDP, are signiﬁcant in a major-
ity of the regressions at the 10 percent level or better, but given the superior
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cients from those equations to calibrate his later simulations. 
None of the measures of reserves adequacy perform well at predicting
sudden stop. The ratio of reserves to M2 performs best: it is signiﬁcant in
four of the sixteen equations. Jeanne notes that these results are consistent
with the empirical literature, which ﬁnds an ambiguous beneﬁt of reserves
in reducing the probability of sudden stops. Jeanne also offers an impor-
tant caveat even to the conclusion that greater reserves decrease the prob-
ability of currency crises. Existing studies, including this one, cannot
distinguish the prevention of a crisis from its mere postponement. And in
some cases trying to maintain a high level of reserves in the face of a loss
of conﬁdence in domestic policies may actually hasten a crisis. 
Even if reserves have no influence on the probability of a crisis, they
have an important role in mitigating the effects of a crisis on output and
domestic absorption. Jeanne describes some ways in which international
reserves can be used to reduce the loss of output. One way is to intervene in
foreign exchange markets to mitigate a rapid depreciation of the currency
and its disruptive effects on balance sheets; another is to allow the monetary
authorities to provide liquidity to domestic ﬁnancial markets, the banking
sector, and even exporters. He points out that providing such liquidity is
especially valuable if there is significant dollarization of bank deposits
and other domestic liabilities.
A fall in domestic absorption is an important indicator of the welfare
costs of a sudden stop. Domestic absorption, the sum of consumption and
domestic investment, is also the sum of domestic output, capital inflows,
net income from abroad, and reductions in reserves. Reserves can be used
to offset a drop in output or capital inﬂows, stabilizing absorption. Jeanne
examines the behavior of each of these in a ﬁve-year window surrounding
sudden stops for each country in his sample. Not surprisingly given the
criteria he uses to identify sudden stops, net capital inflows drop almost
10 percent relative to GDP in the year of the sudden stop, regaining about
60 percent of that fall in the next two years. Strikingly, a decrease in
reserves offsets most of the capital account reversal, with a sudden stop
causing domestic absorption to fall by only 3 percent of GDP in the year
before the stop. GDP falls only slightly in the year of the shock but grows
more slowly than trend in the following two years. It seems likely that the
observed fall in output following a sudden stop is less than would have
occurred if reserves were not used for stabilization. Since, in his model, a
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assume in his baseline calibration that the drop in output following a shock
is 10 percent of GDP. But he also notes that in some cases the capital ﬂight
in sudden stops may itself reﬂect, rather than cause, a loss of reserves and
the associated damage to the economy. 
The opportunity cost of reserves—the difference between the return on
reserves and that on alternative investments—is of ﬁrst-order importance in
determining optimal reserves, but it is difficult to measure. One approach
is to assume that physical capital is the alternative investment. In that case,
with an estimated average real rate of return of almost 8 percent a year for
seventeen of the countries in Jeanne’s sample, and with an average of U.S.
real short-term interest rates taken as the return on reserves, the opportu-
nity cost of reserves is 6 percent. But investment in physical capital carries
more risk than many other long-term assets, and its return should be
adjusted downward to compensate. Using the interest rate on central banks’
domestic currency assets (that is, the cost of sterilization) gives a much
lower number, and in the case of countries with very low interest rates, such
as China recently, the implied opportunity cost would be negative. Jeanne
argues that this measure ignores expected depreciation and that although
this rate is relevant to central bank proﬁts, it may be a poor measure of the
opportunity cost to the country as a whole. A third measure of opportunity
cost is the spread between the interest rate on external debt and the return on
reserves; by this measure the annual opportunity cost averaged 8.4 percent
during 2000–05 for emerging market countries in the aggregate, but it is
much higher than the average in Latin America, where it grew rapidly dur-
ing 2000–02 and then gradually declined. The level and variation of the
Latin American spread undoubtedly reflect the risk of default. Jeanne
observes that if the default risk premium is a fair reﬂection of the probability
of less than full repayment, it should not be included in the opportunity cost. 
Jeanne calculates the forgone earnings on the 2000–05 reserves holdings
of emerging market countries using three different estimates of the opportunity
cost. Using only the 2 percent term premium, the average annual costs for the
Asian countries are 0.45 percent of GDP and a more modest 
0.22 percent of GDPfor Latin America, where reserves are much lower relative
to GDP. Using the return to capital to capture the opportunity cost more than
doubles these losses, to 1 percent of GDPin the case of the Asian economies.
How do the reserves actually held by emerging market countries com-
pare with optimal levels? Jeanne begins by calculating the levels implied by
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cussion: 10 percent of GDP for the size of a sudden stop and the loss of
output, and a 3 percent annual opportunity cost of reserves. He considers
two alternative measures of the probability of a crisis. The first assigns a
ﬁxed probability of 10 percent, consistent with the historical frequency of
sudden stops for his sample of countries; in this case optimal reserves
depend only on the ratio of the opportunity cost to such an exogenous prob-
ability. The second is an endogenous probability that depends on the ratio
of reserves to short-term debt as estimated by Jeanne’s univariate probit
regressions. The only other parameter of the model, the degree of relative
risk aversion, is set at 2, a conventional value. The benchmark calibration
with a fixed probability of a crisis implies that optimal reserves are 
7.7 percent of GDP. This is close to the average ratio of reserves to GDP
observed in Jeanne’s sample for 1980–2000, but significantly lower than
in recent years, especially in Asia. If reserves are credited with a reduction
in the probability of a crisis in line with the probit estimates, optimal
reserves are much greater, over 20 percent of GDP. 
Jeanne shows that the sensitivity of optimal reserves to these parame-
ters is substantial. Doubling the baseline opportunity cost or halving the
baseline probability cuts optimal reserves to approximately zero; cutting
the opportunity cost to 1
1⁄2 percent or raising the probability of crisis to 
20 percent almost doubles optimal reserves. Similarly, doubling the size
of a sudden stop or the output cost of a crisis signiﬁcantly increases optimal
reserves. An implication of these sensitivities is that ﬁxed rules such as the
Greenspan-Guidotti rule, although perhaps useful in particular situations,
are unlikely to be appropriate for all countries at all times. But it is also
clear that the recent levels of reserves in many emerging market countries
can only be justified by parameter values that are far from the baseline
assumptions. 
This conclusion leads Jeanne to examine more closely the differences
in countries’vulnerability to sudden stops and currency crises, as evidenced
by the experience before the recent buildup of reserves. He runs separate
probit regressions for the probability of sudden stops and crises for the
period 1980–2000 on the pooled sample of countries, experimenting with
a variety of economic indicators as explanatory variables. In his preferred
speciﬁcations, the deviation of the real exchange rate from trend is signiﬁ-
cant in both sudden stops and currency crises, with a weak currency low-
ering the probability. The current account and the public debt, both relative
xvi Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
10657-00b_Editors Sum.qxd  8/15/07  10:10 AM  Page xvito GDP, and foreign liabilities relative to money are also signiﬁcant for sud-
den stops. Consistent with the earlier results, the ratio of reserves to short-
term debt is highly significant for currency crises. All these results are
robust with respect to the inclusion of ﬁxed country or time effects. Track-
ing countries, Jeanne ﬁnds large differences in the probability of crises over
time. The probability of a sudden stop in any given year of the early 1980s
reached 14 percent for both the Asian and the Latin American countries. It
then declined, more rapidly for the Asian economies, to a common low of
about 4 percent around 1990. Since then the experience of the two regions
has diverged strongly. Except for an upward blip, the probability of a sud-
den stop stayed low for the Asian economies in the 1990s, but it rose
rapidly in Latin America, with the GDP-weighted average returning to the
heights of the early 1980s. The probability of currency crisis followed the
same pattern until the 1990s. At the beginning of that decade, the prob-
ability rose rapidly in Latin America but then slowly drifted down, paral-
leling the pattern in Asia but always substantially higher. The estimated
probabilities for China are noteworthy: 2.7 percent for a sudden stop, and
less than 0.2 percent for a currency crisis in 2000. 
The model’s estimate of optimal reserves for insurance against sudden
stops, using the country-speciﬁc probabilities and the baseline values of the
other parameters, confirms the view that the aggregate reserves of the
emerging market countries in Jeanne’s sample are far more than they need
for that purpose, and that this is almost entirely a reflection of the large
reserves holdings of the Asian economies. According to the model, opti-
mal reserves in 2000 for the Asian countries in the sample totaled $24 bil-
lion, whereas actual reserves were $406 billion. The optimal level
according to the model is actually zero in China, Korea, and Malaysia,
because the probability of a sudden stop for those countries is so low. To
rationalize the levels actually held in these countries would require
extremely high risk aversion, a low opportunity cost of reserves, or an out-
put loss in the event of a sudden stop in excess of 30 percent. By contrast,
the observed level of reserves is actually slightly below the estimate of opti-
mal reserves for the Latin American economies. 
Higher reserve levels would be called for if reserves lower the prob-
ability of a crisis. Using the estimate of this effect from the probit regres-
sions explaining currency crises, Jeanne calculates the expected beneﬁt, net
of costs, for the reserves buildup of 2000–05 assuming a 10 percent output
loss in the event of crisis and an opportunity cost of 3 percent. For the Asian
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five times the benefit. The probabilities of a crisis were already so low in
2000 that the further reductions in probability are trivial. But in Latin
America, where the probabilities were significant in 2000, the benefit of
additional reserves outweighs their cost. Jeanne cites Mexico as an exam-
ple, where doubling the reserves held in 2000 would have reduced the prob-
ability of a crisis that year from 9.6 percent to 5.6 percent. 
Given the apparent failure of the precautionary model to explain the
accumulation of reserves by the Asian economies, what is likely to be the
true explanation? Jeanne’s main alternative explanation is that the accu-
mulation is the unintended consequence of a mercantilist policy of pursu-
ing large current account surpluses. Such a policy requires that the central
bank accumulate reserves to avoid an appreciation of the currency, together
with capital controls and ﬁnancial repression to avoid inﬂation. In support
of this explanation, he reports cross-country correlations showing that, dur-
ing 2000–05, reserves accumulation was associated with current account
surpluses and unrelated to changes in gross external liabilities. The change
in the ratio of reserves to GDP is also correlated with capital account
restrictions. These correlations are hard to reconcile with a precautionary
explanation, for which the risk of capital outﬂows is central. 
Jeanne notes that a mercantilist strategy involves, at least implicitly, an
accumulation of claims against the rest of the world, but also that it need
not involve levels of highly liquid international reserves beyond those
required for precautionary reasons. He observes that emerging market
countries have started to mitigate the cost of holding excess reserves by
transferring a portion of their foreign exchange reserves from the central
bank to new “sovereign wealth funds,” which are not unlike the natural
resource–based stabilization funds set up by a number of commodity
exporters. He cites the sovereign wealth funds of Korea and China as recent
examples, and he reports forecasts that the holdings of such funds, already
more than $2 trillion, could exceed $12 trillion by 2015. 
Would such a development lead to disruptions in exchange rates and in
the relative prices of ﬁnancial assets in global markets? Jeanne documents
the signiﬁcant difference in size between the portfolios of the ofﬁcial and
the nonofficial sectors and considers, as an example, the likely effect of
shifting $450 billion of the roughly $2 trillion in foreign assets into a
“world” portfolio. His back-of-the-envelope calculations show that
although such a shift plays against the dollar, and in particular against ﬁxed-
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fractions of outstanding stocks, with moderate effects on prices and
exchange rates. But Jeanne also points out that a substantial portion of
outstanding U.S. debt is held by the foreign official sector, and that the
effect on the interest rate the U.S. government pays may be nonnegligible,
depending on the substitutability between U.S. Treasury securities and
other forms of dollar debt in the portfolios of global investors. He also
cautions that if the pace of diversification is rapid, the effects might be
much larger than would be expected in the long run.
Jeanne argues that the abundance of reserves held by emerging market
countries reduces the need for collective insurance provided at the global
level by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and various regional insur-
ance arrangements, noting that the increase in reserves in the Asian emerg-
ing market counties over 2000–05 was more than four times the IMF’s
usable assets at the end of 2005 and more than twenty times the bilateral
swap agreements to date under the Chiang Mai Initiative launched by a
group of Asian countries in 2000. He suggests various other potential uses
of the large accumulated stocks, such as collective insurance for risks other
than capital account crises; such risks might include severe shocks to coun-
tries’terms of trade or output, as well as natural disasters. He also sug-
gests that sovereign wealth could be used to promote the development of
regional financial markets, which might in turn serve as a catalyst for
private investment in Asian issues and help enable emerging market coun-
tries develop investment instruments with long maturities, denominated in
domestic currency, which would be safer for borrowers. 
Finally, Jeanne observes that even if the recent high rate of reserves
accumulation were to abate, the public sectors of many emerging market
economies will have to manage stocks of foreign financial assets of
unprecedented size for some time to come. Although it may be a challenge
to ensure that the diversification of those assets avoids large or abrupt
changes in the relative prices of financial assets or exchange rates, the
growth in sovereign wealth of these countries provides many new oppor-
tunities to beneﬁt the developing world. 
THE ACCELERATION OF PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH was an economic hallmark
of the second half of the 1990s. After twenty years during which labor pro-
ductivity growth averaged only around 1.5 percent a year, it rose at an aver-
age annual rate of over 2.5 percent between 1995 and 2000. That
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mance, not only through the direct effect of raising national income at given
levels of employment but also by its effect on the conduct of monetary pol-
icy: then–Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan’s early recognition that
productivity was speeding up is credited with the continuation of monetary
accommodation, which in turn permitted a strong expansion of employ-
ment and reduction of unemployment for another ﬁve years. Most analysts at
the time attributed an important part of the productivity acceleration to the
continuing boom in information technology (IT) hardware and software.
When IT investment declined sharply after 2000, that diagnosis of the boom
period implied that the productivity trend would also slow. It did not. In the
second article of this issue, Stephen Oliner, Daniel Sichel, and Kevin Stiroh
use the surprising developments of both the pre- and post-2000 periods to
reﬁne our understanding of productivity growth, project the likely future path
of productivity, and assess the uncertainty surrounding that projection. 
As the framework for their analysis, the authors extend the growth
accounting model they developed previously to study the role of IT capital
in the nonfarm business sector. As in standard growth accounting, growth
in aggregate labor productivity in their model can be decomposed into the
contribution from the increase in capital per hour worked, the contribution
from improved labor quality, and growth in multifactor productivity (MFP),
each measured as an aggregate average. The authors extend this standard
model in several directions. To focus on the role of IT, they disaggregate
total output into five IT-producing sectors and a sixth, non-IT-producing
remainder. Data for four of the IT-producing sectors—computer hardware,
software, communications equipment, and semiconductors—are taken
from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs). Exports of semi-
conductors are classified as final output in the NIPAs, and the remaining
output in this sector is treated as intermediate inputs to the others. The
ﬁfth IT sector produces intangible IT capital; since this output is not mea-
sured in the NIPAs, the authors introduce their own estimate. This intangi-
ble output is treated as investment, whose services are inputs to future
production. The authors also take account of cyclical influences on pro-
ductivity growth (changes in factor utilization) and of the adjustment costs
associated with new capital goods; both these factors could have had sig-
niﬁcant effects on observed productivity movements over the past decade.  
Using their six-sector disaggregation, the authors estimate the effect of
the business cycle on measured MFP growth, which they take as propor-
xx Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
10657-00b_Editors Sum.qxd  8/15/07  10:10 AM  Page xxtional to the length of the workweek, and of the costs of adjustment, which
they take as proportional to investment. Each of these effects drives a
wedge between measured MFP growth and the true pace of improvements
in technology and similar underlying effects affecting long-run growth.
Lengthening the workweek is expected to boost measured MFP growth as
ﬁrms get more output from their capital and labor, and raising investment is
expected to lower MFP growth as firms divert resources from producing
market output to installing new capital. Aggregate MFP growth and the
aggregate effects of these adjustments are given by the share-weighted sum
of the sectoral MFP growth rates, where the weights are shares of each
sector’s gross output in aggregate value added. Because not all the data
required for a thoroughgoing bottom-up estimation of these sectoral rela-
tions are available, the authors rely in part on estimates made at the aggre-
gate level and distributed to the sectors, and on estimates of certain
parameters from earlier research by themselves and others. 
The authors ﬁrst undertake a growth accounting that does not incorpo-
rate the estimates of intangible IT capital. This accounting, using only the
familiar standard NIPA data, shows how the effects of the business cycle
and adjustment costs on investment influence the accounting for the pro-
ductivity surge in the late 1990s and after 2000. Average annual growth of
labor productivity picked up from about 1.5 percent during 1973–95 to
about 2.5 percent in the following five years, and to 2.9 percent during
2000–06. Of the initial 1.0-percentage-point speedup, 0.6 percentage point
reflected the quickened growth of IT capital, and another 0.5 percentage
point came from the acceleration of MFPin IT-producing sectors, so that IT
accounted for slightly more than the entire acceleration in labor produc-
tivity. The cyclical and adjustment cost effects were each noticeable. Com-
pared with the pre-1995 long-run average, the strong expansion added
0.16 percentage point to annual MFP growth during 1995–2000, and the
adjustment costs associated with high investment reduced MFP growth by
0.15 percentage point in this period. The two effects having opposite signs,
their combined effect was negligible. 
The accounting for the further acceleration of MFP after 2000 is quite
different. The cyclical and adjustment cost effects are again substantial, but
of the opposite sign from the previous ﬁve years, and again roughly cancel
each other out. But compared with 1995–2000, in the post-2000 period IT
capital deepening and MFP growth in IT-producing industries are both
slower and together contribute 0.7 percentage point a year less to labor pro-
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growth both contribute substantially more, accounting for more than the
entire further acceleration of labor productivity in this period. Averaged
over the whole 1995–2006 period, total IT contributions account for
roughly two-thirds of the acceleration in labor productivity. However, com-
paring just the post-2000 period with 1973–95, the total contribution of IT
accounts for only about a quarter of the 1.4-percentage-point acceleration. 
To better understand these developments and how they may inform pro-
jections of future productivity growth, the authors next construct a measure
of intangible IT capital and introduce it into their growth accounting. In
earlier work, Carol Corrado, Charles Hulten, and Sichel argued that any
intangible asset that provides services beyond the current period should be
considered as part of the capital stock, with its production counted as
investment in current-period output. Using a wide range of data sources,
they estimated that such intangible investment, ranging across such cate-
gories as research and development, computerized information, and ﬁrm-
specific organizational capital, totaled roughly $1 trillion a year over
2000–03, or almost as much as business ﬁxed investment. 
To obtain up-to-date estimates of the intangible capital that can be asso-
ciated with IT, the authors turn to a model developed by Susanto Basu and
coauthors and based on the idea that intangible capital is a complement of
IT capital as measured. That model specifies a function in which tangible
and intangible IT capital are treated as complementary factors, with ﬁrms
optimizing the ratio of the two given their relative costs. Total output then
depends on this combined IT input, labor, and non-IT capital. The opti-
mization of tangible and intangible IT capital inputs assumes an elasticity
of substitution between them of 1.25, a value that best approximates the
trend in the income shares of the two estimated by Basu and coauthors. The
estimates are anchored to the values in the original Corrado-Hulten-Sichel
data by making the average income share of intangible capital over
1973–2003 equal to the income shares of those intangibles that are IT
related in those authors’original estimates. The present authors thus gen-
erate a time series for intangible capital and, using a standard perpetual
inventory relation, a series for intangible investments associated with it.
Although intangible capital investment is linked to IT investment in these
constructed series, the price declines in ITcapital cause its user cost to trend
lower, leading intangible capital to grow less rapidly than IT capital in all
periods. This difference is more pronounced after 1995 than before. 
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of the production accounts compared with the standard NIPA treatment.
And the augmented framework changes both the pattern of labor produc-
tivity over time and the accounting for its growth. In the baseline case,
which corresponds to the timing assumptions in the model of Basu and
coauthors, labor productivity growth speeds up by 1.4 percentage points
in 1995–2000, even more than the 1-percentage-point speedup in the NIPA
data, reflecting both the more rapid growth of output when investment in
intangible capital is added to the NIPAestimates, and greater capital deep-
ening. Labor productivity then grows by 2.4 percent a year on average in
the following period, or 0.4 percentage point less than in the NIPA esti-
mates. Including intangible investment in output has a noticeable effect on
MFP growth. Whereas the NIPAdata implied speedups in MFP of 0.7 per-
centage point after 1995 and a further 0.6 percentage point after 2000, the
augmented data imply a 0.9-percentage-point speedup after 1995 and only
a negligible further change after 2000. The contribution of capital deep-
ening from intangible capital speeds up by 0.1 percentage point after 1995
and then declines by 0.4 percentage point after 2000.
The baseline estimates assume a contemporaneous relation between the
growth of IT capital and the growth of intangible capital associated with
it. To check the robustness of their results, the authors present three alter-
native series for intangibles that allow for a smoothing of their relation to
IT capital and, alternatively, a one-year lag of intangibles growth behind
IT capital growth. The smoothing is accomplished by using a three-year or
a ﬁve-year centered moving average for the growth rate of ITcapital and its
user costs in the equations used to generate estimates of intangible capital.
In each of these alternatives, after 2000 there are noticeable declines in
intangible capital investment and slight declines in the capital services from
intangibles. The range of estimates across these four series indicates that
the results are quite robust to the variations in timing that are considered.
Annual labor productivity growth speeds up by between 1.4 and 1.1 per-
centage points after 1995 and slows by between 0.5 and 0.1 percentage
point after 2000. The contribution of intangible capital deepening speeds up
by 0.1 percentage point after 1995 in all alternatives and slows down by
between 0.3 and 0.4 percentage point after 2000. And the contribution of
aggregate MFP to labor productivity speeds up by between 0.7 and 
0.9 percentage point after 1995 and by a further 0.04 to 0.4 percentage point
after 2000. 
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alternatively, on annual measures of value added and gross output from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and combine each of these with
data on hours from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to calculate two
alternative measures of average labor productivity by industry. The value
added-based measures of productivity by industry combine directly to an
aggregate measure of labor productivity for all private industry. The gross
output–based measures require an allowance for changes in intermediate
inputs to be reconciled with that aggregate. The authors also calculate a
proxy for capital services, using BEA data on nonresidential capital that is
disaggregated by type and industry. The available data permit calculation of
average labor productivity growth for sixty industries for the period
1988–2005. The value added–based estimates allow the authors to form a
panel of ﬁfteen broad sectors and a private industry aggregate made up of
their sixty industries. Labor productivity growth rates for this aggregate dif-
fer somewhat from those for the more inclusive BLS data covering the
private nonfarm business sector. But the authors capture the pickup in pro-
ductivity growth after 1995 and the smaller further pickup after 2000 that
characterizes the BEA aggregates. Among the fifteen broad sectors, pro-
ductivity speeded up after 1995 in eight, which together account for 73 per-
cent of value added. After 2000, productivity continued growing faster than
it had during 1988–95 in six of these sectors: durable goods; wholesale
trade; retail trade; professional and business services; education services,
health care, and social assistance; and agriculture. Each of these sectors is a
relatively large part of the economy, except agriculture, which is very
small. And productivity accelerated sharply in the information industry,
leaving its productivity growth over the entire 1995–2005 period well
above its previous rate. 
To examine the contribution of IT, the authors classify individual indus-
tries according to whether they are IT producing, IT using, or neither. IT-
producing industries are the four industries classed as such by the BEA,
which together produced nearly 5 percent of aggregate value added in
2005: computer and electronics products, publishing including software,
information and data processing services, and computer system design
and related services. IT-using industries are deﬁned as those whose use of
IT exceeds that of the median industry (excluding IT producers). The
authors then decompose the changes in labor productivity for their private
industry aggregate into the direct contributions of IT-producing industries,
xxiv Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2007
10657-00b_Editors Sum.qxd  8/15/07  10:10 AM  Page xxivIT-using industries, and other industries, and the contribution coming from
reallocations across industries. Using the industry value-added data, they
measure the contribution from input reallocations by changes in hours
worked across industries. This contribution is positive when hours grow
relatively more in high-productivity industries. When the industry gross
output data are used, the contribution from reallocations includes, in addi-
tion, changes in intermediate inputs across industries. This contribution is
positive when gross output is rising faster than purchased material inputs. 
Both the gross output–based and the value added–based measures assign
a dominant role to ITin the acceleration of labor productivity after 1995. Of
the 0.96-percentage-point acceleration in the aggregated industries measure
during 1995–2000, the analysis using the gross output data attributes 
1.45 percentage points to the direct effect of productivity acceleration in IT-
producing and IT-using industries, and a small decline to other industries.
The reallocation effects are −0.48 percentage point from intermediate
inputs and 0.13 percentage point from hours. The value-added data show
direct effects of 1.16 percentage points from IT industries and a small
decline in the others, along with a 0.13-percentage-point hours realloca-
tion effect. In both cases the large direct ITcontribution comes mainly from
IT-using industries. The small further acceleration of 0.32 percentage point
in aggregate productivity after 2000 is accounted for very differently in
the two data sets. The growth output data attribute −0.94 percentage point
to the direct effects of industry productivity growth, with IT-producing,
IT-using, and other industries all contributing to the slowdown. The hours
reallocation contributes 0.31 percentage point and the intermediate inputs
reallocation contributes 0.94 percentage point. The value-added data show
no change in direct effects, with a small deceleration in IT producers off-
setting a small acceleration in IT users. In both the gross output and the
value-added data, over the entire post-1995 period, the direct contribution
of IT-using and IT-producing industries accounts for most of the speedup in
aggregate labor productivity; the direct contribution of other industries is
slightly negative. 
The authors perform regressions on their industry-level data to further
explore the acceleration of productivity. They construct two alternative
measures of IT intensity by industry: one is the share of IT capital services
in total capital services, and the other is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an
industry’s use of ITcapital as a share of its total capital is above the median
for all industries. Using the gross output data, they find that IT-intensive
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1995, but they find no further significant effect on productivity growth
starting in 2000. The value-added data yield less signiﬁcant results. 
Some analysts have speculated that productivity growth after 2000 may
have been driven by unusual pressures on firms to restructure so as to cut
costs in a more competitive environment. To explore this and related
hypotheses, the authors examine the relation between the change in indus-
try profit share from 1997 to 2001 and the growth of hours and labor
productivity from 2001 to 2004 across their sixty-industry sample. On aver-
age, industries with below-median changes in profitability experienced 
2 percentage points slower hours growth and 3 percentage points faster pro-
ductivity growth than those with above-median changes in proﬁtability. The
authors go on to run separate regressions using the change in profits
between 1997 and 2001 to explain growth rates in hours, intermediate
inputs, labor productivity, and output over 2001–04, the period of
extremely rapid productivity growth. The regressions include a number of
additional variables to control for demand effects, longer-run trends, and IT
intensity. With either the gross output or the value-added data, they ﬁnd sig-
niﬁcant negative effects of changes in proﬁts on growth rates of hours and
significant positive effects on labor productivity, no effects on intermediate
inputs or gross output, and marginally significant effects on value added.
These results are consistent with the idea that competitive pressures and
restructuring help explain the post-2000 productivity gains. The regressions
also reveal no signiﬁcant effects from ITintensity on productivity or output,
which the authors interpret as support for the idea that ITwas not an impor-
tant factor in the post-2000 changes in productivity. 
Following their econometric analysis, the authors go on to put recent
productivity gains in historical perspective. They show that labor produc-
tivity growth in the private sector has averaged 2.2 percent a year since
1909. Dividing that nearly century-long period into several subperiods,
they show that annual productivity growth averaged 2.9 percent during
1950–73, the “golden era” of productivity growth, and 2.8 percent during
1995–2006. It averaged around 1.5 percent a year in 1909–28 and 1973–95,
the two remaining periods. Thus the recent past is one of unusually rapid
growth relative to historical experience. 
Looking ahead, the authors report a range of steady-state growth rates
that would be consistent with their growth accounting model under vari-
ous parameter assumptions. The key parameters affecting aggregate labor
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advance in technology outside the IT-producing sectors. Capital deepen-
ing is endogenously determined by the rate of growth of MFP outside IT.
Using bounds for these parameter values based on historical experience,
they calculate upper and lower bounds for projected steady-state annual
productivity growth of 3.1 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively. The center
of the range is 2
1⁄4 percent. At the lower-bound estimate, capital deepening
contributes 0.75 percentage point and MFPgrowth 0.56 percentage point to
productivity growth. At the higher bound, capital deepening contributes
1.39 percentage points and MFP 1.55 percentage points. The authors show
that their central projection of 2
1⁄4 percent is very near the projections of a
number of other studies, and close as well to their own ten-year projec-
tions using a Kalman filter model that allows estimation of a stochastic
process for productivity growth. But they stress that the uncertainty around
their own projections, and presumably around the others as well, is
considerable. 
ONE PERSISTENT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN the poor and the rich countries of
the world is that rich countries have more real capital per worker. All else
equal, the marginal return to capital should be lower where capital is more
abundant. It follows that investment funds should profitably flow from
richer to poorer countries. Since Robert Lucas pointed out in 1990 that it
typically does not, analysts have tried to understand the reasons for this
seemingly perverse phenomenon. Some invoke financial market inef-
ficiencies that interfere with the productive investment of capital; others
point to political or policy instabilities in poor countries that make invest-
ments in them exceptionally risky. Recently, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and
Olivier Jeanne have expanded the Lucas paradox by showing that capital
flows to nonindustrialized countries have not been concentrated among
those growing relatively fast, even though successful growth would pre-
sumably indicate that capital is productive in those countries and that they
are relatively creditworthy. Understanding why foreign capital inﬂows have
not been associated with faster growth and, more generally, how interna-
tional capital flows influence the development process are key issues for
developing countries, which must decide whether and how to open their
economy to global investors. In the third article of this volume, Eswar
Prasad, Raghuram Rajan, and Arvind Subramanian take a further look at
these issues. 
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flows over the past few decades, focusing on national current accounts,
which are the counterpart to the broadest measure of net foreign finance.
Acurrent account surplus equals the sum of net outﬂows of private and ofﬁ-
cial ﬁnancial capital, net accumulation of reserves, and net errors and omis-
sions. The last of these reconciles direct measures of current account ﬂows,
such as exports and imports, with direct measures of capital ﬂows, such as
equity and debt purchases, and is generally thought to reﬂect capital mov-
ing through unmeasured channels. Thus a positive number for errors and
omissions is customarily treated as a capital outﬂow, just as a purchase of
foreign securities or a deposit in a foreign bank would be. The authors show
that, at least since the early 1990s, the sum of current account surpluses in
economies with surpluses has risen sharply as a share of world GDP. This
might have been expected given the growing globalization of international
ﬁnance. What is more striking is that, since the early 1980s, the average rel-
ative income of the countries with current account surpluses (the capital
exporters) has trended down even as the average relative income of coun-
tries with current account deﬁcits has trended up. Much of this difference in
income trends remains even when the United States and China, two large
outliers, are omitted from the calculations. 
Going a step beyond the simple association of growth and current
accounts, the authors divide their sample of some sixty nonindustrialized
economies into four groups depending on whether a country’s current
account balance, as a ratio to GDP, was above or below the group median
and whether its ratio of real investment to GDP was above or below the
median. Averaged over 1970–2004, higher investment ratios and larger cur-
rent account surpluses are both associated with faster growth in GDP per
capita. Among countries with high investment ratios, those with less
reliance on foreign capital grew faster, by an average of 1 percentage point
a year. 
To examine these connections more rigorously, the authors turn to
regressions using annual data covering 1970–2004 for their sample of non-
industrialized countries. They ﬁrst present cross-sectional regressions that,
following the work of Barry Bosworth and Susan Collins, explain pur-
chasing power–adjusted growth rates in GDP per capita over this period
with the ratio of the current account to GDP and a number of control vari-
ables: the logarithm of initial GDPper capita, initial-period life expectancy,
trade openness, the fiscal balance, a measure of institutional quality, and
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Their baseline regression ﬁnds a signiﬁcant positive association of growth
with current account balances, indicating that countries that rely less on for-
eign finance grow faster. Among the control variables, institutional qual-
ity, initial GDP per capita, and life expectancy are all significantly
associated with growth. Omitting data for three countries that are outliers
has no effect on these results. But when countries receiving aid ﬂows that
average more than 10 percent of their GDP are also omitted, the coeffi-
cient on the current account balance doubles, and the institutional quality
variable becomes highly signiﬁcant. This indicates that the results are not
driven by large aid recipients. When accumulated foreign assets or liabili-
ties are substituted for the current account balance, they are usually not sig-
niﬁcant, and the regressions do not explain growth quite as well. 
It might be thought that slow growth reflects low investment and that
current account deﬁcits reveal a lack of domestic resources that constrains
investment. However, when the ratio of domestic investment to GDP is
added to the regression with the current account, investment is not signiﬁ-
cant and has little effect on the other variables. The authors take this as
evidence that the correlation of the current account balance with growth
does not arise because investment is constrained by a lack of domestic
resources. By contrast, when the ratio of domestic saving to GDP is added
instead of the investment ratio, it is highly significant and the current
account balance loses significance. The authors interpret this as evidence
that the positive association between current account balances and growth
stems largely from a positive relation between domestic saving and growth. 
Some further regressions investigate the robustness of these basic
results. When estimated over 1985–97, a period when international ﬁnance
grew rapidly and international financial crises were relatively unimpor-
tant, the association of growth with the current account balance is even
stronger. When industrialized countries are added to the sample (and dis-
tinguished by a dummy variable), the coefﬁcient for the nonindustrialized
countries is unaffected, whereas the dummy for industrialized countries has
a significant net negative coefficient, indicating that current account bal-
ances are negatively related to growth in these countries. The same is true
of the countries in transition from socialism when they are added to a
regression estimated over 1990–2004. The authors also add the share of the
working-age population in total population, an exogenous demographic
variable that is expected to be associated positively with saving. Its regres-
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rent account balance variable to insignificance. This, the authors reason,
supports the idea that the association of growth with the current account
balance arises from the relation of domestic saving to growth. Furthering
this argument, they average the experience of countries in the years sur-
rounding spurts in their growth rates and show that such growth spurts have
led to higher saving, a result consistent with a role for habit formation in
consumption.
The authors extend their analysis with panel regressions using ﬁve-year
averages to capture the changes in a country over time, along with many
of the same controls and speciﬁcations as in the cross-sectional regressions.
In these regressions the estimated effect of the current account balance
reaches statistical significance only when countries receiving substantial
aid are dropped from the sample, along with the three large outliers. The
investment-GDP and saving-GDP ratios are each significant when added
separately to the equation, as is the working-age share of the population.
For industrial countries the relation between the current account balance
and growth is again negative. The panel results thus largely support the
cross-sectional results, although with weaker evidence of a positive rela-
tion between the current account balance and growth for nonindustrial
countries. 
The interrelations among the macroeconomic variables being analyzed
make it difﬁcult to establish causality. The current account balance, invest-
ment, and saving are all endogenous, with shocks to any one potentially
affecting the others. Because developments in individual industries have
only modest effects on aggregates, estimation with industry-level data is
less subject to such endogeneity problems. The authors therefore turn to
industry-level data to examine some hypotheses about their aggregate ﬁnd-
ings. They first examine whether manufacturing industries that are rela-
tively dependent on outside financing for investment, as opposed to
ﬁnancing from internal cash ﬂows, grow faster when foreign capital is more
available. Following earlier work by Rajan with Luigi Zingales, they run
separate regressions explaining industry growth for each of ﬁve measures
of foreign capital inflow: the stock of inward foreign direct investment
(FDI), the stock of FDI and portfolio investment combined, the net flow
counterparts of these two measures, and the current account deficit, each
relative to GDP. (Each of these measures is interacted with a measure of the
industry’s dependence on outside financing.) In separate regressions the
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ﬁnancial development. All regressions include the relative size of the indus-
try in the country’s manufacturing value added, and all are cross sections
run separately for average values of the 1980s and the 1990s. The regres-
sions include country and industry ﬁxed effects, in effect explaining within-
country differences in industry growth rates by the industry’s dependence
on outside ﬁnancing and the country’s use of foreign ﬁnancing. 
The regression results generally support the idea that countries with
greater ﬁnancial development respond differently to external ﬁnance. This
result is robust for the 1990s, where all five measures of capital inflow
interacted with dependence on external ﬁnance are signiﬁcantly negatively
related to industry growth for less ﬁnancially developed countries, and pos-
itively related for more financially developed countries. Roughly similar
results are obtained for the 1980s. The ﬁndings are again the same in panel
regressions that include variations across the two decades. The authors
discuss in some detail the various ways in which lower ﬁnancial develop-
ment might interact with other characteristics of economies to affect
growth. Although they can only conjecture about speciﬁcs, they reason that
improving ﬁnancial development brings substantial beneﬁts. 
The authors recognize that reliance on foreign capital may also affect
growth through entirely different channels that change a country’s interna-
tional competitiveness. To explore this possibility, they use regressions to
estimate the relations among currency overvaluation, capital ﬂows or stocks,
and growth, using a measure of overvaluation developed by Simon Johnson,
Jonathan Ostry, and Subramanian that adjusts exchange rates for purchasing
power parity. Cross-country regressions using data averaged over 1970–
2004 explain overvaluation with the working-age population and various
measures of capital stocks and flows. All show a positive association
between the presence of foreign capital and overvaluation. The best-ﬁtting
regressions are for net FDI ﬂows and net private inﬂows. And by far the best
ﬁts are obtained when industrialized economies are distinguished from non-
industrialized economies. In these regressions, capital flows to industrial
economies are more or less unrelated to overvaluation, whereas the relation
is signiﬁcantly positive for nonindustrialized economies. Additional regres-
sions show that overvaluation has a signiﬁcantly negative relation to growth.
Finally, regressions using industry data that distinguish industries by their
potential for exporting show that the negative effects of overvaluation on
an industry’s growth depend on that potential. 
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behind the relations they examine and the many factors that influence
growth. It is clear that nonindustrial countries that have relied relatively
heavily on foreign capital have not grown faster than those that have not.
And their results suggest that the less successful developing countries have
limited capacity to utilize foreign resources, either because their ﬁnancial
markets are underdeveloped, or because they are prone to overvaluation in
the face of rapid capital inflows, or both. Although the authors’results
caution against encouraging some forms of capital inﬂow to reduce the risk
of overvaluation, ﬁnancial openness may be needed to spur development of
the domestic ﬁnancial system. Given this dilemma, the authors reason that
policymakers need to take account of country-speciﬁc issues when opening
the current account and need to be creative and ﬂexible in managing it. 
A CENTRAL FEATURE OF the Job Growth and Taxpayer Relief Reconcilia-
tion Act of 2003 was a large cut in the tax on dividends, lowering the max-
imum rate from over 38 percent to 15 percent. A natural prediction is that
these lower rates will lead to an increase in dividends over time, both by
increasing the distribution of current earnings and by causing a shift from
debt to equity financing of corporations. A number of studies have
attempted to quantify the effects of the tax cut on dividend payments, but
relatively little recent work has been done on how dividends themselves
affect consumption. Estimating these effects from aggregate time series is
confounded by the multitude of factors correlated with dividends that plau-
sibly influence consumption. In the fourth article of this issue, Malcolm
Baker, Stefan Nagel, and Jeffrey Wurgler utilize cross-sectional data on
households to infer the effect of dividends on consumption, how those
effects differ from the effects of capital gains, and by implication how
increases in dividends resulting from tax cuts are likely to affect the sav-
ing available for investment. 
The authors begin by examining the cross-sectional relationship between
dividends and consumption using data from the Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CEX) for 1988–2001. Their sample includes interviews of several
hundred households per year, each household for five consecutive quarters.
The surveys elicit information on households’ consumption, income,
wealth, and ﬁnancial returns as well as important demographic character-
istics. The authors restrict their attention to households with positive
wealth, nonzero holdings of stocks or mutual funds, and unchanged marital
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holds in this sample had, on average over 1988–2001, after-tax income of
$56,566, total consumption expenditure of $48,076, and nondurables con-
sumption of $15,042, all measured in December 2001 dollars. Their ﬁnan-
cial wealth averaged $67,700 and constituted about a third of their average
total wealth. Dividends and interest income averaged $935 and $1,264 a
year, respectively. As expected, the distributions of financial assets and
returns are very unequal, skewed strongly to the right. For example, mean
financial wealth is roughly 1.75 times median wealth, and median dividend
income is zero, even though all of the households in the sample hold some
stock, either directly or through mutual funds. 
Variation in household consumption and dividend income in a cross
section of households undoubtedly reflects a variety of households’non-
financial characteristics in addition to income and other financial variables.
The authors are agnostic about what specific model is the most accurate
representation of consumption behavior and instead attempt to isolate the
causal effect of dividends by controlling for a wide variety of demographic
characteristics. In their basic specification explaining the level of either
total or nondurables consumption, the demographic controls include age
of household head, family size, and education. These variables are allowed
to enter linearly, quadratically, and in interactions with each other and the
financial variables. The authors also include a set of year-month fixed
effects to absorb seasonal variation in consumption as well as variation in
macroeconomic factors affecting the consumption of households sampled
at different times. In their words, “In the end the levels speciﬁcation boils
down to asking whether two consumers in the same ﬁnancial situation, with
similar income, similar household characteristics, and similar total return
on ﬁnancial assets, but different compositions of total returns across divi-
dends and capital gains, have different consumption.” 
The authors ﬁnd that an extra dollar of dividend income has substantial
and statistically signiﬁcant effects on consumption: the marginal propensity
to consume (MPC) is roughly three-quarters for total consumption and one-
sixth for nondurables consumption. The estimated effects of capital gains
on consumption (given by the coefﬁcient on total returns, since dividends
are entered separately) are near zero and insignificant. In specifications 
in which interest is lumped with dividends and included in total returns, 
the MPCs are somewhat smaller than those for dividends alone but also
highly signiﬁcant. The authors include a dummy variable for non-dividend-
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number of zero-dividend observations. They experiment with controlling
for age, noting that dividends are a higher percentage of income for older
households, perhaps because those households are more likely to be in
retirement. The MPC out of dividends for total consumption among those
over 65 is found to be substantially lower than for those younger than 65,
but this result is of borderline statistical signiﬁcance.
The authors recognize that the correlation of consumption with divi-
dends across households may reﬂect in part the effect of some unmeasured
differences in households’characteristics that inﬂuence both consumption
and dividends, or it may reflect a reversal of causation, with households
with high consumption needs choosing high-yielding stocks. Although the
authors believe the controls they use should do a reasonable job of min-
imizing this bias, they recognize that it is difficult to fully rule out some
remaining, unobserved differences between households that hold high-
and low-dividend-paying stocks.
Differencing the consumption levels equations reported above would
remove any fixed household effects correlated with the level of dividend
income, providing a check on whether the estimated MPCs in those equa-
tions are biased by endogeneity. However, the limited information on the
change in a household’s consumption and asset returns in the CEX makes it
impossible to run a true differenced form of the equations. The CEX survey
does provide information for each household on the difference between
quarterly consumption at the second and the fifth interviews, and the dif-
ference in dividends in the twelve months preceding each of those inter-
views. The authors therefore regress the change in consumption between
these two quarters on the change in dividends, the level of total returns,
the age of the household head, and other demographic variables. 
In the equations explaining total consumption, the resulting MPC is
0.057. Assuming that the change in annual dividends affects four quarters
of consumption equally, not just consumption in the quarters reported, this
translates to an MPC of 0.228, roughly a third of the MPCs found in the
levels equations. The authors see this reduction as consistent with some
upward bias in the levels equations, but they note that it could also reﬂect
the noise introduced through the imperfect matching of dividends and con-
sumption measurement periods. If lagged consumption is included in this
equation, the MPC for total consumption is substantially greater, but the
coefﬁcient on lagged consumption is negative, suggesting that more than 60
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is a cross-sectional regression, this negative coefficient could arise if
wealthy households with large financial asset holdings and large absolute
changes in dividends are relatively less responsive to changes in dividends.
The authors add that the lagged level of consumption may be absorbing
some of the noise resulting from the imperfect matching of the dividend
and consumption measurement periods. 
For nondurables consumption the estimated effect of the change in div-
idends is signiﬁcant only when the level of lagged consumption is included;
the MPC is again about a third of that in the corresponding levels equation
and includes a large negative coefficient on lagged consumption. In the
log difference equations, which should be free of scale effects, dividend
changes are entered simply as a dummy variable, equal to 1 when posi-
tive. The estimated effects of dividend increases are large: households
with an increase in dividends have a 7- to 8-percentage-point greater
increase in total consumption than those without an increase. The corre-
sponding point estimates for growth in nondurables expenditure are also
substantial, although not statistically signiﬁcant. 
To supplement these results, the authors turn to a second micro dataset
containing portfolio information for a large number of household accounts
at a large discount brokerage firm. Although this dataset does not include
data on consumption, assets other than those held in the brokerage account,
or household demographic characteristics, it provides much more accurate
and detailed information about dividends, capital gains, and stock transac-
tions. And although the data do not allow estimation of the effects of div-
idends on consumption, they do allow investigation of whether the receipt
of a dividend leads to a withdrawal from the account, which would be
necessary if the dividend were to be used directly for consumption. The
brokerage data also have the advantage that they follow individual house-
holds over long periods. This provides some information on how house-
holds respond over time to dividends and capital gains, whereas in the CEX
data this behavior had to be inferred entirely from cross-sectional dif-
ferences. The authors restrict themselves to households that had an open
brokerage account in 1991, and they exclude margin accounts, IRA and
Keogh accounts, accounts that are not individual or joint tenancy accounts,
and accounts whose value falls below $10,000. They also exclude house-
hold-month observations for which they cannot identify the mutual funds or
common stock in the portfolio if the unidentiﬁable assets constitute at least
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extreme values of withdrawals. Their ﬁnal sample includes 92,412 house-
hold-months. Because the brokerage data do not explicitly report dividend
income, the authors estimate it by matching portfolio holdings with pub-
licly available data on the dividend distributions of specific stocks and
mutual funds. Net monthly withdrawals or additions to accounts are then
calculated as the difference between the end-of-period account value and
the appreciated (end-of-month) value of the assets held at the beginning of
the month plus dividends on those assets during the month. 
A simple scatterplot of household-month net withdrawals against con-
temporaneous total dividends, while showing a large dispersion of net with-
drawals for a given level of dividends, clearly reveals bimodal behavior: a
significant fraction of households at every level of dividends withdraw
either exactly that amount or exactly zero. Aplot of median or average net
withdrawals versus dividends for deciles of total return suggests a very high
propensity to withdraw dividends during the month in which they occur;
similar plots indicate at most a very small withdrawal propensity from total
returns. These graphical results are confirmed by regression. A linear
regression of withdrawals on dividends and total returns, with all vari-
ables expressed as a percentage of previous-period account value, yields
marginal propensities to withdraw dividends and total returns of 0.35 and
0.02, respectively. Both propensities are highly signiﬁcant statistically. On
average, dividends are at reasonable levels, with ordinary monthly div-
idends averaging 0.12 percent of beginning-of-month wealth. However, the
maximum dividends are extremely high, amounting to nearly 30 percent
of beginning-of-month wealth in the case of mutual funds and more than
100 percent in the case of special dividends. The estimated 2 percent
withdrawal of total returns may seem small, but capital gains, which are
much more variable than dividends, may have a nonnegligible effect on
withdrawals. 
The authors show that the results for total dividends mask an important
difference between the propensity to withdraw mutual fund dividends and
that for the other two types, ordinary and special dividends. The propen-
sity to withdraw mutual fund dividends, reﬂecting in part more frequent use
of automatic reinvestment options, is only about half that of the other two,
and the estimate of the propensity to withdraw ordinary dividends is
approximately 0.8 for all but the highest yields, which is considerably
larger than the estimates for the aggregate of dividends. 
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twelve-month lag of dividends. The results provide some clues about the
dynamics of withdrawals and the importance of what the authors call “ex
ante” effects, that is, the possibility that dividends are endogenous. If un-
observed household characteristics, such as retirement, lead some house-
holds to choose high-dividend portfolios to support their consumption,
causation is reversed, with consumption and withdrawals causing dividends
rather than the other way around. The fact that the data include both cross-
sectional and intertemporal observations makes it difﬁcult to distinguish the
effects of unmeasured household differences from withdrawal dynamics for
a given household. The authors report that a one-year lag of ordinary div-
idends explains 57 percent of current dividends, and together with a three-
month lag it explains 81 percent of current dividends. This may reﬂect the
relative permanence of dividends paid on individual stocks, but also
unmeasured and relatively permanent household characteristics. The effects
of including lags in the mutual fund equation are similar, but smaller. In
both cases the coefﬁcient estimates are imprecise. In the case of special and
other dividends, which are likely to be unexpected and therefore unlikely to
involve reverse causation, the lagged effect has a significant negative co-
efﬁcient. This may help explain why, in the regressions for total dividends,
where the type of dividend is not distinguished, lagged dividends are not
significant. The authors conclude that although there is some evidence 
of reverse causation, it is likely to play a fairly modest role in the case of
ordinary and mutual fund dividends, and even less of a role for special
dividends. They believe that all of the results are consistent with an impor-
tant element of causality running from dividends to withdrawals and, based
on their analysis of the CEX data, to consumption. 
Having concluded that the MPC out of dividends is substantial and much
greater than for capital gains, the authors discuss various possible expla-
nations for this behavior. They argue that borrowing constraints, sometimes
used to rationalize a high sensitivity of consumption to current income, do
not explain the large gap between the MPC from dividends and that from
capital gains. While acknowledging that, in principle, transaction costs
could explain that gap, they note that the propensities are essentially the
same for households that are saving, who could simply save less without
incurring additional transaction costs, and that the propensity is the same or
higher for households with high portfolio turnover, who also could reinvest
dividends with little additional cost. 
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tax-rate households withdraw much more than needed to meet the associ-
ated tax obligation and that, throughout their sample period, the tax rate
was much higher on dividends than on capital gains, suggesting that, if any-
thing, consumption needs should be met by selling stock. They acknowl-
edge there is empirical support for the idea that aggregate consumption
responds more to permanent than to transitory changes in asset values,
and they recognize that changes in dividends may provide information
about the permanent component of stock returns. But they observe that their
results are driven largely by cross-sectional, not intertemporal, variations in
returns and that the use of time fixed effects in their regressions absorbs
aggregate movements in asset values, so that differences in capital gains
across household-month observations are relatively permanent. Although
the remaining variation in idiosyncratic household stock returns may have
a transitory component, they ﬁnd it difﬁcult to explain the large difference
between the consumption of dividends and that of capital gains by its
presence.
The authors suggest that mental accounting theories may provide the
best explanation of their results. They give as an example a model devel-
oped by Hersh Shefrin and Richard Thaler in which households place
wealth into one of three mental accounts—current income, current assets,
and future wealth—and follow the popular advice to “spend income, not
principal.” Indeed, Shefrin and Thaler explicitly predict that the propen-
sity to consume wealth categorized as current income, such as dividends, is
greater than that from wealth categorized as assets. Not only is this predic-
tion consistent with the authors’main results, and with the fact that their
estimate of the MPC of dividends is similar to the MPC of labor income,
but mental accounting can also rationalize other features of their results,
such as the fact that the MPC for special dividends falls in between that
for ordinary dividends and that for capital gains. They recognize that the
underlying psychology behind this sort of mental accounting is an impor-
tant open question, and they suggest that self-control and prospect theory
are potential psychological roots.
Many proponents of the Job Growth and Taxpayer Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2003 argued that the dramatic tax cut on dividends, by lowering the
cost of capital, would stimulate investment and saving. The authors’results
suggest that the cuts might indeed have stimulated the economy, but by
leading to an increase in consumption rather than in investment and saving.
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necessarily increasing dividend payouts. But even without higher payouts,
the reduction in taxes on existing dividends could have signiﬁcant effects
on consumption. The middle range of the estimates of the MPC from
before-tax dividends implies an MPC from after-tax dividends above 0.7.
Using the IRS ﬁgure for individuals’dividend income in 2002 of $103 bil-
lion and James Poterba’s estimate of the reduction in the average marginal
tax rate on dividends resulting from the tax cut, the authors calculate that
consumption would increase by about $8.5 billion. 
Increases in dividends, induced by the more attractive tax treatment of
dividend income, would substantially add to that effect. The authors report
that evidence on the importance of the cut tax for dividend payouts is
mixed. Survey evidence suggests a relatively minor role, but a study led
by Raj Chetty and Emmanuel Saez that compares dividend payouts of ﬁrms
with different tax incentives credits the tax cuts with virtually all of the
increase in dividends from 2002 to 2003. This would imply an additional
$5.8 billion in consumption, for a total effect of $14.1 billion. Using 
the authors’high-end estimate of the MPC would raise that estimate to 
$23.8 billion. If the cut were credited with the increase in dividends over
two years, these effects would be roughly doubled. Although these numbers
do not look large relative to total consumption expenditure in 2003 of 
$7.7 trillion, the authors observe that they are not small relative to the 
$66 billion standard deviation of consumption increases over the previous
ﬁve years. 
In conclusion, the authors observe that their ﬁndings that the composi-
tion of financial returns is of first-order importance in explaining con-
sumption has implications for a range of questions in corporate finance,
macroeconomics, behavioral economics, and tax policy. They stress that the
interesting result is not that the propensity to consume capital gains is low,
but that the propensity to consume dividends is so high. And they suggest
that this difference may, at least in part, reﬂect mental accounting processes
of the sort summed up in the adage “consume income, not principal.” 
HISTORICALLY, INCREASES IN short-term interest rates in periods of mon-
etary tightening have been accompanied by increases in longer-term yields.
Yet between June 2004 and February 2005, a period in which the Federal
Open Market Committee raised the federal funds rate by 150 basis points,
the ten-year yield on government bonds fell 70 basis points and the ten-year
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conundrum by then–Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan in testi-
mony before Congress, this pattern of interest rates perplexed many econ-
omists and ﬁnancial analysts. By June 2005 the ten-year forward rate had
fallen a total of 170 basis points, despite further Federal Reserve tightening.
Since then the forward rate has rebounded, but by only about 50 basis
points. Observers have offered a range of possible reasons for this puz-
zling behavior, invoking changes in expectations of long-term growth of
output or inﬂation, global increases in saving, declines in macroeconomic
and financial uncertainty, better allocation of risk, and developments that
change the demand for or the supply of long-term ﬁxed-income securities.
In a report that concludes this issue, David Backus and Jonathan Wright dis-
cuss the empirical basis for such explanations and the ﬁndings of bond pric-
ing models that decompose forward rates into term premiums and expected
future short-term rates. Versions of these models that distinguish between
the real and the inflation components of interest rates find that declining
term premiums, rather than changes in expected real rates or inflation,
appear to be the major element in the surprising behavior of long-term rates.
This leads the authors to explore the possible inﬂuence of various changes
in the macroeconomic environment on the term premium itself. 
Backus and Wright begin by presenting some basic facts about the
conundrum and the behavior of variables often cited as central to the deter-
mination of the yield curve. The conundrum is real. They show that during
the three preceding episodes of monetary tightening, starting in 1986, 1994,
and 1999, the ten-year yield on U.S. Treasurys increased sharply, in stark
contrast with the modest decline in long-term yields in the recent episode.
Long-term yields are essentially an average of short-term rates and forward
rates, and the authors show that the modest decline in long-term yields itself
masks a sharp decline in forward rates, offset by the increase in short-term
rates. Plotting monthly data on the ten-year Treasury forward rate against
the unemployment rate from January 1985 to February 2007, they show
that although forward rates in the recent recovery show the same counter-
cyclical behavior as in earlier recoveries, the level is 1
1⁄2 to 2 percentage
points lower than past cyclical patterns would predict.
Achange in inﬂation expectations, suggested by some as the explanation
for the drop in long-term rates, should show up in the behavior of nominal,
but not real, forward rates. Using the rate on Treasury inflation-protected
securities (TIPS) as a measure of real rates, the authors show that the shifts
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curves were similar, although the shift in the nominal curve was greater.
At a ten-year horizon, the nominal curve dropped by 172 basis points,
whereas the real curve dropped by 96 basis points. In interpreting this dif-
ference, the authors note that the TIPS rate includes an inflation risk pre-
mium and a TIPS liquidity premium as well as an indication of expected
inﬂation. 
Are these shifts consistent with forecasts of inﬂation, GDP growth, and
short-term interest rates in 2004–05? The authors report that the profes-
sional forecasts in the Blue Chip surveys for this period show little move-
ment in expected inﬂation or GDPgrowth at a ﬁve- to ten-year horizon. The
long-range forecast of the three-month Treasury bill rate was also ﬂat. They
conclude that the recent decline in long-term yields does not come from
expected declines in any of these three variables. 
Indicators of shifts in investors’perception and pricing of risk are more
promising candidates. The authors report that, between 2004 and early
2005, there were sharp declines in the spread between Baa- and Aaa-rated
corporate debt and in the implied volatility of one-year interest rate caps, a
measure of short-term volatility in the six-month London interbank offer
rate. Realized volatility, measured by the standard deviation of daily
changes in forward rates and an index tied to the short-term volatility of
S&P stock index options, also declined during the period. The authors ﬁnd
this persuasive evidence that ﬁnancial market risk and risk premiums across
a range of assets were substantially lower in 2005 than they had been two
or three years earlier.
The source of the decline in asset market volatility is less clear. The
authors regard macroeconomic uncertainty, particularly at long horizons, as
inherently difficult to measure. Although recent Federal Reserve commu-
nications may have given markets more forward-looking guidance, which
may have made the path of monetary policy more predictable, the broader
impact on asset market volatility is less evident. Taking the view that the
dispersion of long-horizon predictions may reflect intrinsic uncertainty,
the authors show that the dispersions of predictions of consumer price inﬂa-
tion, real GDP growth, and the three-month Treasury bill rate have all
trended noticeably lower. Most of the decline in the dispersion of interest
rate and inﬂation expectations occurred in the early 1990s; both then rose in
the last recession before declining again over the conundrum period. The
authors note that movements in forward rates for the United States, Ger-
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years, and rates have declined in a number of middle-income countries as
well. So explanations for the decline in U.S. forward rates should not be
conﬁned to U.S. developments and should account for the decline that has
occurred more broadly.
Backus and Wright turn from this evidence—that lower risk or term pre-
miums, rather than declines in expected inﬂation or future short-term real
rates, are responsible for the decline in long-term yields and forward
rates—to the results of more formal affine bond pricing models, all of
which decompose long-term forward rates into expected future short-term
rates and a time-varying term premium. Such models all generate yields
and forward rates that are linear functions of a vector of state variables,
which themselves follow a linear autoregressive process. The models differ
in their choice of explanatory variables. The simplest use a small number of
“latent” factors characterizing the level and shape of the current yield curve
as state variables, but more recent versions add direct information about the
dynamics of interest rates or other economic variables. 
The authors present results for three such augmented versions. The ﬁrst
uses professional forecasts of Treasury bill rates to identify the expected
short-term rate component of the forward rate. This decomposition suggests
that nearly the entire decline in ten-year-ahead forward rates from June
2004 to June 2005 comes from a decline in the term premium. Since then
the term premium has been roughly constant, with a small rise in the for-
ward rate attributed to a comparable rise in expected future short-term rates.
A second version adds the dynamics of inflation to the model, making it
possible to price synthetic real bonds and decompose a nominal forward
rate into an expected future real short-term rate, expected future inﬂation,
a real term premium, and an inﬂation risk premium. The third version dis-
tinguishes the same four components of forward rates but makes direct
use of the information in TIPS yields, which are assumed to equal the sum
of yields on a synthetic liquid real bond and a TIPS liquidity premium. This
model’s estimates of the ten-year forward rate suggest that the real term
premium has fallen sharply since June 2004, and the inﬂation risk premium
by a lesser amount. On the other hand, expected future real short-term inter-
est rates have been flat, and expected future inflation has actually risen
modestly. 
Ashortcoming of afﬁne term structure models is the lack of an economic
explanation of movements in the latent factors that serve as state variables.
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inflation uncertainty by regressing the nominal term premiums estimated
from the first model just described on unemployment and the dispersion
of long-term inflation forecasts. They find that the coefficients in this
regression are statistically signiﬁcant, and the variables explain a substan-
tial fraction of the decline in term premiums since 1990, their rise in
2000–02, and a modest portion of their decline since June 2004.
The authors view the combination of facts about risk spreads and volatil-
ities, survey expectations, and afﬁne model decompositions as persuasive
evidence that a decline in term premiums, rather than a decline in future
expected rates, is likely to be the principal explanation for the decline in
long-horizon forward rates from June 2004 to June 2005. They recognize
that the models do not provide conclusive answers. However, they stress
that, within this framework, the arithmetic identity that the forward rate is
the sum of these two components carries a strong implication. If term pre-
miums did not decline, then the long-run expectation of the federal funds
rate must have fallen by about 1.7 percentage points. They note that eco-
nomic forces—for example, an increase in global saving or a scaling back
of expectations about long-run productivity growth amid weak business
investment—could have worked to lower the expected real short-term rate.
But they doubt that such factors caused the large decline actually observed,
given the robust growth during the period and the upward drift in infla-
tion. The same arithmetic implies that if the term premium today equals
its 2-percentage-point average over the last twenty years, then the current
forward rate of about 5 percent implies an expected federal funds rate ten
years hence of close to 3 percent. 
What factors could explain the decline in uncertainty about future inﬂa-
tion, interest rates, and growth that Backus and Wright have identiﬁed as a
partial explanation of the decline in term premiums? Those they identify
include more credible and transparent monetary policy, a global trend
toward central bank independence, and the greater integration of ﬁnancial
markets, which reduces the potential for short-term gains from adopting a
more inflationary policy. As evidence supporting this view, they cite the
especially sharp decline in forward rates in the United Kingdom around
1997, when the Bank of England was granted operational independence.
But as contrary evidence they note that one would have to explain why it
was only in the last few years, long after the disinﬂation engineered by the
Federal Reserve under Chairman Paul Volcker in the early 1980s, that U.S.
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tained indefinitely. Still, the authors place reduced inflation uncertainty
resulting from changes in central bank policy high on the list of plausible
explanations.
Backus and Wright cite three other proposed explanations for the decline
in term premiums in particular countries, but they note that these have more
difﬁculty explaining the pattern across countries. The decline in real long-
term rates in the United Kingdom could reﬂect the prospect that U.K. cor-
porate pension reform will encourage pension funds to better match the
durations of their assets and liabilities, causing a substantial increase in
the demand for long-duration securities. But this explanation does not fit
the United States, where pension reform has proceeded more slowly. The
large purchase of U.S. Treasury securities by Asian central banks might
have contributed to the fall in the U.S. forward premium but does not
explain the parallel falls in Germany and the United Kingdom, unless the
bonds of all three countries are close substitutes. Last, the authors discuss
the suggestion that changing demographics may have contributed, as large
cohorts nearing retirement shift their savings from risky equities to bonds
and other relatively safe assets. Setting aside the question of whether the
equity premium has increased coincidently with a decline in the term pre-
mium, the authors note that demographics are slow moving and predictable,
with no substantial or unexpected shift having occurred in or around June
2004. 
The authors conclude that the evidence points to a declining term pre-
mium as the primary source of the recent fall in long-term rates, and that
such a decline is broadly consistent with observed changes in risk spreads
and other measures of uncertainty. But they recognize that the economics
profession is far from having a complete understanding of the behavior of
bond prices. In their view the next step should be the development of mod-
els in which macroeconomic policy and behavior can be tied more directly
to the behavior of interest rates. They believe that recent lines of research
give hope that eventually economists will better understand the connections
between macroeconomic developments and ﬁnancial market outcomes.
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